Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders

  title={Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders},
  author={Elias Koutsoupias and Stefano Leonardi and Tim Roughgarden},
  booktitle={EC '13},
We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide… 
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