Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods

@article{HalonenAkatwijuka2012NatureOH,
  title={Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods},
  author={Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka},
  journal={Journal of Public Economics},
  year={2012},
  volume={96},
  pages={939-945}
}

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