National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?

  title={National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?},
  author={Mich{\`e}le B. Baettig and Thomas Bernauer},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={281 - 308}
Abstract This article examines whether democracies contribute more to the provision of global public goods. It thus contributes to the debate on the effects of domestic institutions on international cooperation. The focus is on human-induced climate change, in Stern's words “the biggest market failure the world has ever seen.”1 Using new data on climate change cooperation we study a cross-section of 185 countries in 1990–2004. The results show that the effect of democracy on levels of political… 

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  • Political Science
    British Journal of Political Science
  • 2020
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  • 2012
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