Nash implementation with partially honest individuals

@article{Dutta2009NashIW,
  title={Nash implementation with partially honest individuals},
  author={Bhaskar Dutta and Arunava Sen},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2009},
  volume={74},
  pages={154-169}
}
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest” individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, all social choice correspondences satisfying No Veto Power can be implemented. If all individuals are partially honest and if the domain is separable… CONTINUE READING
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