Corpus ID: 85532385

Nash equilibrium of partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables

@article{Satoh2018NashEO,
  title={Nash equilibrium of partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables},
  author={Atsuhiro Satoh and Yasuhito Tanaka},
  journal={arXiv: General Economics},
  year={2018}
}
We consider a partially asymmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. Two players (A and B) have the same payoff functions, and Player C does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for $i=A, B, C$. Mainly we will show the following results. 1. The equilibrium when all players choose $t_i$'s is equivalent to the equilibrium when Players A and B choose $t_i$'s and Player C chooses $s_C$ as their strategic variables. 2. The equilibrium when all players choose… Expand

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