Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality

@inproceedings{Maskin1999NashEA,
  title={Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality},
  author={Eric Maskin},
  year={1999}
}
If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals’ preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of ‘‘welfare optima’’. A game form (or ‘‘mechanism’’) implements the social choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (i) any welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form (implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (ii) all Nash equilibria are welfare… CONTINUE READING
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