Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

@article{Moore1990NashIA,
  title={Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization},
  author={John. Moore and Rafael Repullo},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1990},
  volume={58},
  pages={1083-1099}
}
The authors extend E. Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--they examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency results). The two-agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining. For this case, too, they establish a condition… 
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