Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?

  title={Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?},
  author={Gary L Wells},
  journal={Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  • G. Wells
  • Published 1 May 1992
  • Psychology
  • Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Five studies tested the idea that people are reluctant to make proplaintiff liability decisions when the plaintiffs evidence is based on naked statistical evidence alone. Students (n = 740) and experienced trial judges (M = 111) averaged fewer than 10% affirmative decisions of liability when a case was based on naked statistical evidence but averaged over 65% affirmative decisions based on other forms of evidence even though the mathematical and subjective probabilities were the same for both… 

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