author={Edward J. Green and Robert H. Porter},
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed. LONG-STANDING QUESTIONS about how widespread is the occurrence of collusion in… 

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  • G. Stigler
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1964
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