NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES

@article{Nash2020NONCOOPERATIVEG,
  title={NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES},
  author={John F. Nash},
  journal={Classics in Game Theory},
  year={2020}
}
  • J. Nash
  • Published 1 September 1951
  • Economics
  • Classics in Game Theory
we would call cooperative. This theory is based on an analysis of the interrelationships of the various coalitions which can be formed by the players of the game. Our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalitions in that it is assumed that each participant acts independently, without collaboration or communication with any of the others. The notion of an equilibrium point is the basic ingredient in our theory. This notion yields a generalization of the concept of the… 
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  • Economics
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  • A. Garro
  • Economics
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  • 2009
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References

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What if the opponent plays imperfectly"? 3. How do you choose one equilibrium when there are potentially many? 4. What if the Nash Equilibrium is unsatis- factory
  • What if the opponent plays imperfectly"? 3. How do you choose one equilibrium when there are potentially many? 4. What if the Nash Equilibrium is unsatis- factory
What reenements, generalizations can be made based on the ideas of equilibrium", solution" as presented here?
  • What reenements, generalizations can be made based on the ideas of equilibrium", solution" as presented here?
What about actually nding Nash equilibrium points?
  • What about actually nding Nash equilibrium points?
Pick a favorite application economics, biology , international relations, philosophy, etc. and talk about that
  • Pick a favorite application economics, biology , international relations, philosophy, etc. and talk about that