• DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511528231.007
• Corpus ID: 124452949

NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES

@article{Nash2020NONCOOPERATIVEG,
  title={NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES},
  author={John F. Nash},
  journal={Classics in Game Theory},
  year={2020}
}

• J. Nash
• Published 1 September 1951
• Economics
• Classics in Game Theory

we would call cooperative. This theory is based on an analysis of the interrelationships of the various coalitions which can be formed by the players of the game. Our theory, in contradistinction, is based on the absence of coalitions in that it is assumed that each participant acts independently, without collaboration or communication with any of the others. The notion of an equilibrium point is the basic ingredient in our theory. This notion yields a generalization of the concept of the solution of a two-person zerosum game. It turns out that the set of equilibrium points of a two-person zerosum game is simply the set of all pairs of opposing "good strategies." In the immediately following sections we shall define equilibrium points and prove that a finite non-cooperative game always has at least one equilibrium point. We shall also introduce the notions of solvability and strong solvability of a non-cooperative game and prove a theorem on the geometrical structure of the set of equilibrium points of a solvable game. As an example of the application of our theory we include a solution of a