Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy

  title={Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy},
  author={Andrew J. Healy and Neil Malhotra},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={387 - 406}
Do voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Using data on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending, but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. These inconsistencies distort the incentives of public officials, leading the government to underinvest in disaster preparedness, thereby causing substantial public welfare losses. We… 
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  • 2019
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