Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization

@article{Strotz1955MyopiaAI,
  title={Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization},
  author={Robert H. Strotz},
  journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
  year={1955},
  volume={23},
  pages={165-180}
}
  • R. H. Strotz
  • Published 1955
  • Economics
  • The Review of Economic Studies
This paper presents a problem which I believe has not heretofore been analysed2 and provides a theory to explain, under different circumstances, three related phenomena: (1) spendthriftiness; (2) the deliberate regimenting of one’s future economic behaviour— even at a cost; and (3) thrift. The senses in which we deal with these topics can probably not be very well understood, however, until after the paper has been read; but a few sentences at this point may shed some light on what we are up to… 

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