Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War

  title={Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War},
  author={Branislav L. Slantchev and Ahmer Tarar},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
Blainey (1988) popularized the argument that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about their relative bargaining power. This is known as the mutual optimism cause of war. Fey and Ramsay (2007) argue that existing models of crisis bargaining cannot properly evaluate this explanation. They propose an alternative class of models with features they claim are better suited for the purpose, and prove that war cannot occur with positive probability in equilibrium in any… Expand
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  • The Journal of Politics
  • 2019
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