Mutual Optimism and War

@article{Fey2007MutualOA,
  title={Mutual Optimism and War},
  author={Mark Fey and Kristopher W Ramsay},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
  year={2007},
  volume={51},
  pages={738-754}
}
Working with the definition of mutual optimism as war due to inconsistent beliefs, we formalize the mutual optimism argument to test the theory's logical validity. We find that in the class of strategic situations where mutual optimism is a necessary condition for war—i.e., where war is known to be inefficient, war only occurs if both sides prefer it to a negotiated settlement, and on the eve of conflict war is self-evident—then there is no Bayesian-Nash equilibrium where wars are fought… Expand
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