Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection

@article{Zhong2019MultipleLM,
  title={Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection},
  author={Li-Xin Zhong and Wen-Juan Xu and Rongda Chen and Yun-Xin He and Tian Qiu and Fei Ren and Yong-Dong Shi and Chen-Yang Zhong},
  journal={Chaos, Solitons \& Fractals},
  year={2019}
}
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