Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making

  title={Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making},
  author={Sean Gailmard},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={161 - 186}
  • S. Gailmard
  • Published 1 April 2009
  • Economics
  • Journal of Theoretical Politics
I examine a model in which multiple legislative principals monitor a bureaucratic agent's implementation of a project. The principals can each perform oversight of the implementation to limit information asymmetries exploited by the agent. Oversight is costly to perform and due to information leakages between principals, oversight by one principal reveals information to all principals. Thus for some values of the audit costs, there is a collective action problem in monitoring among the… 

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