Multipart pricing of public goods

@article{Clarke1971MultipartPO,
  title={Multipart pricing of public goods},
  author={Edward H. Clarke},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={1971},
  volume={11},
  pages={17-33}
}
  • E. H. Clarke
  • Published 1 September 1971
  • Economics
  • Public Choice
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References

SHOWING 1-5 OF 5 REFERENCES
“ Multipart Pricing of Public Goods
  • Public Choice
  • 1971
The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights
Our economic system, with its specialization of economic activities into separate ownership and decision units, requires both control over goods and exchange of goods if it is to cope with theExpand
The Pure Theory of Public Expanditure
Классическая работа лаурета Нобелевской премии по экономике Пола Самуэльсона, заложившая основу современной теории общественных благ. В статье формулируются условия выбора оптимального объемаExpand