Multilateral bargaining with concession costs

  title={Multilateral bargaining with concession costs},
  author={G. Caruana and L. Einav and D. Quint},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  • G. Caruana, L. Einav, D. Quint
  • Published 2007
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • J. Econ. Theory
  • This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients: (i) There is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) Prior to the deadline, players may sequentially change their demands as often as they like; (iii) Changing one's demand is costly, and this cost increases as the deadline gets closer. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in which agreement is reached… CONTINUE READING
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