Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building

Abstract

We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of multidimensional screening with complementary activities. Results are not… (More)
DOI: 10.3390/g4030532

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Cite this paper

@article{Borges2013MultidimensionalSW, title={Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building}, author={Ana Pinto Borges and Didier Laussel and Jo{\~a}o Correia-da-Silva}, journal={Games}, year={2013}, volume={4}, pages={532-560} }