Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes

  title={Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes},
  author={Mostapha Diss and Ahmed Doghmi},
  journal={Public Choice},
The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc. These four election methods are extensions of usual scoring rules designed for electing a single winner and are compared on the basis of two criteria. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability for a peculiar voting rule to select the Condorcet committee, provided that such a committee… 

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