• Corpus ID: 245986747

Multi-item Non-truthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue

  title={Multi-item Non-truthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue},
  author={Constantinos Daskalakis and Maxwell Fishelson and Brendan Lucier and Vasilis Syrgkanis and Santhoshini Velusamy},
We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format satisfying certain technical conditions, we run simultaneous item auctions augmented with a personalized entry fee for each bidder that must be paid before the auction can be accessed. These entry fees depend only on the prior distribution of bidder types… 

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