Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle

@article{Banzhaf1966MultiMemberED,
  title={Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle},
  author={Banzhaf and F Avery Jones John},
  journal={Yale Law Journal},
  year={1966},
  volume={75},
  pages={1309-1338}
}
  • Banzhaf, F. John
  • Published 1 July 1966
  • Political Science
  • Yale Law Journal
mathematical analysis may suggest that the results are equally abstract and that the conclusions are primarily of academic interest. The following analysis of multi-member district systems in 40. In actual practice, people often choose various positions on any given issue. However, these can always be broken down, as the legislator must eventually do, into a series of yes or no answers to a number of specific legislative proposals. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.11 on Tue, 18 Oct 2016… 
FAIR APPORTIONMENT AND THE BANZHAF INDEX
2. Background. In three articles that appeared in American law journals in the mid-1960's, a lawyer named John Banzhaf III proposed to evaluate representation systems in terms of the extent to which
ALTERNATIVES TO SINGLE-MEMBER PLURALITY DISTRICTS: LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES*
While single-member districting (smd) is the most common form of representation in the U.S., apportionment schemes at the state and local level often make use of multimember districts (Klain 1955;
Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: the Design of Multi-member Districts
TLDR
This work studies the design of multi-member districts (MMDs), in which each district elects multiple representatives, potentially through a non-winner-takes-all voting rule, and finds that with threemember districts using Single Transferable Vote, fairness-minded independent commissions would be able to achieve proportional outcomes in every state up to rounding.
Voting power and at-large representation
A study of the Constitutional Treaty's voting reform dilemma
1.1. The dilemma As it turns out, the voting scheme that Giscard d’Estaing’s Praesidium put into the draft Constitutional Treaty is not politically acceptable to all EU members (it concentrates power
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES FOR ACHIEVING THE GOALS
While single-member districting (smd) is the most common form of representation in the U.S., apportionment schemes at the state and local level often make use of multimember districts (Klain 1955;
Votes for Sale: The Logic of Power in Joint-Stock Companies
The joint-stock company as an institution rests on two major principles. On the one hand, it embodies the logic of collective choice. The ultimate rights to power are vested in a constituency
Measuring Power in Weighted Voting Systems
There are a large number of voting situations in which some individuals or blocs of voters effectively cast more ballots than others. Such weighted voting systems are found in governmental bodies
The structure of voting-power indices
ConclusionsThe difference between the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index refers to one assumption, the assignment of a priori probabilities to how voting units choose between “aye” and “no”
Voting power in municipal annexation elections
In many American states, municipal annexation and consolidation require concurrent majority votes of all affected jurisdictions. The effectiveness and fairness of this voting procedure have been
...
1
2
3
4
5
...