• Corpus ID: 238634423

Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards

  title={Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards},
  author={Chang Liu},
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can choose to shirk at any time. The principal knows the reward of the task and provides information to the agent over time. The optimal information policy can be characterized in closed form, revealing two key channels that make dynamic disclosure valuable: one is that the principal is impatient compared with the agent… 

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