• Corpus ID: 238634423

Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards

  title={Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards},
  author={Chang Liu},
This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate e ff ort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can choose to shirk at any time. The principal knows the reward of the task and provides information to the agent over time. The optimal information policy can be characterized in closed form, revealing two key conditions that make dynamic disclosure valuable: one is that the principal is impatient compared with the… 


Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future
  • I. Ball
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • 2019
It is shown that the sender can implement the sender's optimal dynamic information policy in closed form by truthfully reporting the realized state with a delay that shrinks over time.
Paying with Information
A principal who has a project with uncertain returns must retain and incentivize an agent using promise of future payments and information control. The agent's effort produces output and facilitates
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A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside
Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
A dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion is considered: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in MPE, as the cost vanishes.
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A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with delay is the optimal
Bayesian Persuasion
The notion of a persuasion mechanism is introduced: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology that strictly benefits Sender.
Dynamic Information Disclosure
We explore the optimal timing of voluntary disclosures by firms. By delaying disclosure of a signal, firms encourage the acquisition of correlated signals by reducing informed investors’ exposure to
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
This chapter discusses zero-sum games with lack of information on both sides, strategies, Payoffs, Value and Equilibria, and non-observable actions.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ abstract=3661779. 1. σ is a signal process σ t (q) ∈ ∆ ({0, 1})
  • 2021