• Corpus ID: 195345728

Most Important Fundamental Rule of Poker Strategy

  title={Most Important Fundamental Rule of Poker Strategy},
  author={Sam Ganzfried and Max Chiswick},
  booktitle={FLAIRS Conference},
Poker is a large complex game of imperfect information, which has been singled out as a major AI challenge problem. Recently there has been a series of breakthroughs culminating in agents that have successfully defeated the strongest human players in two-player no-limit Texas hold 'em. The strongest agents are based on algorithms for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies, which are stored in massive binary files and unintelligible to humans. A recent line of research has explored approaches… 

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