More about base station location games

  title={More about base station location games},
  author={François M{\'e}riaux and Samson Lasaulce and Michel Kieffer},
This paper addresses the problem of locating base stations in a certain area which is highly populated by mobile stations; each mobile station is assumed to select the closest base station. Base stations are modeled by players who choose their best location for maximizing their uplink throughput. The approach of this paper is to make some simplifying assumptions in order to get interpretable analytical results and insights to the problem under study. Specifically, a relatively complete Nash… 

Competitive location in cognitive radio networks

The paper addresses the problem of strategic base stations placement in cognitive radio networks. We consider a primary user, operating on the frequency channels of a primary network, and an operator

Competitive location in cognitive radio networks

It is proved that the follower's problem is NP-hard and the leader’s problem is $$\varSigma _2^P$$Σ2P-hard" and the value of competition for the strategic planning in cognitive radio networks is confirmed.

A jammer's dilemma: Where and how to jam

  • A. GarnaevY. HayelE. Altman
  • Computer Science
    2012 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization (NetGCooP)
  • 2012
It is proved that the game has a unique equilibrium and it is described explicitly this equilibrium, its structure and some properties, which has interesting features for determining an optimal behavior of the jammer and the transmitter.

The effect of competition among brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services

This work has been partly supported by National Science Foundation awards: CNS-0963974, CNS-1346688, CNS-1536090 and CNS-1647084.



Spatial games and global optimization for the mobile association problem: The downlink case

A new approach based on optimal transport theory to characterize the solution based on previous works on fluid approximations to determine the optimal solution from both the global network and the individual user points of view, for the downlink setting.

Nash Equilibria in Voronoi Games on Graphs

It is shown that deciding the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a given graph is NP-hard, and a new measure, the social cost discrepancy, is introduced, defined as the ratio of the costs between the worst and the best Nash equilibria.

Decentralized Learning of Nash Equilibria in Multi-Person Stochastic Games With Incomplete Information

It is proved that all stable stationary points of the algorithm are Nash equilibria for the game and it is shown that the algorithm always converges to a desirable solution.

Worst-case Equilibria

On the Continuous Fermat-Weber Problem

This work gives the first exact algorithmic study of facility location problems that deal with finding a median for acontinuum of demand points, and provides polynomial-time algorithms for various versions of the L1 1-median (Fermat-Weber) problem.

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Preface (R.J. Aumann, S. Hart). Strategic equilibrium (E. van Damme). Foundations of strategic equilibrium (J. Hillas, E. Kohlberg). Incomplete information (R.J. Aumann, A. Heifetz). Non-zero-sum

Static competitive facility location: An overview of optimisation approaches

Stability in Competition

After the work of the late Professor F. Y. Edgeworth one may doubt that anything further can be said on the theory of competition among a small number of entrepreneurs. However, one important feature

Matrix Iterative Analysis

  • S. Abbott
  • Engineering
    The Mathematical Gazette
  • 2000
Roughly one in six of Walsh's 281 publications are included, photographically reproduced, and reproduction is excellent except for one paper from 1918, which is an obituary.