More Insiders , More Insider Trading : Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts Viral

  title={More Insiders , More Insider Trading : Evidence from Private Equity Buyouts Viral},
  author={Viral Acharya and Timothy C. Johnson},
This paper studies how insider trading intensity is affected by the joint effects of competition and regulation. Prior theoretical research has found that, in the absence of regulation, more insiders leads to more insider trading. We show that optimal regulation, however, features detection and punishment policies that get stricter as the number of insiders increases, giving rise to lower insider trading in equilibrium. We construct measures of the likelihood of insider activity prior to bid… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.
11 Citations
20 References
Similar Papers


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 20 references

Informed trading around merger announcements: An empirical test using transaction volume and open interest in options markets

  • N. Jayaraman, M. B. Frye, S. Sabherwal
  • The Financial Review
  • 2001
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

Long-lived private information and imperfect competition

  • C. W. Holden, A. Subrahmanyam
  • Journal of Finance
  • 1992
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

Social osmosis and patterns of crime

  • R. K. Sah
  • Journal of Political Economy
  • 1991
Highly Influential
4 Excerpts

Trading in target stocks before takeover announcements

  • Y. Gao, D. Oler
  • 2004
Highly Influential
3 Excerpts

Global debt markets in 2007: New paradigm or the great credit bubble

  • E. Altman
  • Financial Economics
  • 2007
1 Excerpt

Institutional stock trading on loan market information

  • V. Ivashina, Z. Sun
  • Harvard Business School working paper
  • 2007
1 Excerpt

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…