More E ↵ ort with Less Pay : On Information Avoidance , Optimistic Beliefs , and Performance ⇤ New and Preliminary Version

@inproceedings{Huck2017MoreE,
  title={More E ↵ ort with Less Pay : On Information Avoidance , Optimistic Beliefs , and Performance ⇤ New and Preliminary Version},
  author={Ste↵en Huck and Nora Szech and Lukas M. Wenner and Kai Barron and Sibille Hackel and Alex Imas and Terri Kneeland and Henrik Orzen},
  year={2017}
}
Recent behavioral models argue in favor of avoidance of instrumental information. We explore the role of information avoidance in a real-e↵ort setting. Our experiment o↵ers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance of instrumental information exist, studying information structures on performance pay. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of e↵ects of self-selection. Third, the findings support theories on… CONTINUE READING

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