• DOI:10.1080/13869790903494556
• Corpus ID: 143362163

Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions

@article{Mele2010MoralRF,
  title={Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions},
  author={Alfred R. Mele},
  journal={Philosophical Explorations},
  year={2010},
  volume={13},
  pages={101 - 111}
}

• A. Mele
• Published 1 June 2010
• Philosophy
• Philosophical Explorations

Two questions guide this article. First, according to Fischer and Ravizza (jointly and otherwise), what epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for performing an action A are not also requirements for freely performing A? Second, how much progress have they made on this front? The article's main moral is for philosophers who believe that there are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing that are not requirements for freely A-ing because they assume that Fischer (on his own or otherwise) has shown that this is so. In showing that this assumption is false, I reopen an important question for these philosophers: How are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing related to requirements for freely A-ing? This is an interesting question in its own right, of course.