Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions

@article{Mele2010MoralRF,
  title={Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions},
  author={Alfred R. Mele},
  journal={Philosophical Explorations},
  year={2010},
  volume={13},
  pages={101 - 111}
}
  • A. Mele
  • Published 1 June 2010
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Explorations
Two questions guide this article. First, according to Fischer and Ravizza (jointly and otherwise), what epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for performing an action A are not also requirements for freely performing A? Second, how much progress have they made on this front? The article's main moral is for philosophers who believe that there are epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for A-ing that are not requirements for freely A-ing because they assume that… 
Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility
  • M. Montminy
  • Philosophy
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
  • 2021
I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a
Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?
This article explores the conceptual connections between free action and action for which the agent is morally responsible. Questions addressed include the following. Can agents who are never morally
Excuses and Alternatives
Abstract A version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s
First-person representations and responsible agency in AI
TLDR
It is concluded that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be, and the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind of agency to A ISs.
Habit, Omission and Responsibility
Given the pervasiveness of habit in human life, the distinctive problems posed by habitual acts for accounts of moral responsibility deserve more attention than they have hitherto received. But
Moral responsibility and the continuation problem
Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it
Robustness and Up-to-us-ness
Abstract Frankfurt-style cases purport to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action despite not having any alternatives. Some critics have responded by highlighting various
Does Non-Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Situational Awareness and Attributions of Blame and Forgiveness
In this paper, we set out to test empirically an idea that many philosophers find intuitive, namely that non-moral ignorance can exculpate. Many philosophers find it intuitive that moral agents are
Personal identity and manipulation arguments
In this thesis, I defend compatibilism from all manipulation arguments. Manipulation arguments are supported by control cases. These cases purport to be counter-examples to all plausible current
Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism
In this paper, I defend a version of compatibilism (about determinism and moral responsibility) against luck-related objections. After introducing the types of luck that some take to be problematic
...
1
2
3
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 20 REFERENCES
My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility
This is a selection of essays on moral responsibility that represent the major components of John Martin Fischer's overall approach to freedom of the will and moral responsibility. The collection
Essays on Actions and Events.
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render
Free will and luck
The problem of free will is a problem about control and luck. If causal determinism is true, then everything we do is ultimately a matter of luck, as it is if causal determinism is false. Either way
Deontic morality and control
Acknowledgements 1. Introduction Part I. Determinism and Deontic Morality: 2. Obligation and control 3. Frankfurt-type cases and deontic control 4. Control requirements of deontic anchors: some
The Truth about Tracing
If Kevin’s kleptomania is so severe that it produces in him a literally irresistible desire to steal, then there is a straightforward sense in which he couldn’t help himself (at the time he steals).
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
This revised translation of Aristotle's classic treatise contains ten books based on the famous doctrine of the golden mean which advocates taking the middle course between excess and deficiency.
Living with Uncertainty
TLDR
The key finding was that a lack of diagnosis caused uncertainty over the nature of the cause of the sufferer’s complaint, and this uncertainty reportedly caused negative impacts on sufferers’ daily lives.
Intention
The Metaphysics of Free Will
...
1
2
...