Moral judgment and decision making under uncertainty

  title={Moral judgment and decision making under uncertainty},
  author={Nadine Fleischhut and Gerd Gigerenzer and Elke Van der Meer and Werner G{\"u}th},
From virtue theory to moral psychology to behavioral economics, a range of disciplines have explained behavior in moral situations by states of the individual mind, such as character traits, moral stages, or social preferences. These internal explanations predict that moral behavior is stable across a range of situations and thus struggle with the common observation of inconsistencies in moral judgment and behavior. In contrast, we first outline how the same heuristic predicts systematically… 

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