Moral Responsibility and Merit

  title={Moral Responsibility and Merit},
  author={Matt King},
  journal={Journal of Ethics \& Social Philosophy},
  • Matt King
  • Published 2017
  • Sociology
  • Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy
In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility in the "desert-entailing sense." This is meant to distinguish it from causal or legal responsibility and to draw it closer to our other moral concepts. Moral responsibility and desert are natural partners: Morally responsible agents can be blameworthy and praiseworthy--they can deserve blame and praise. This convergence on responsibility in the desert-entailing sense is a welcome… Expand
The nexus of control: intentional activity and moral accountability
There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness toExpand
Guilt, Desert, Fittingness, and the Good
Desert-realists maintain that those who do wrong without an excuse deserve blame. Desert-skeptics deny this, holding that though we may be responsible for our actions in some sense, we lack the kindExpand
Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt
It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appearExpand


Responsibility and the moral sentiments
This text argues that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministicExpand
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment
Recently, a number of philosophers have begun to question the commonly held view that choice or voluntary control is a precondition of moral responsibility. According to these philosophers, whatExpand
On being and holding responsible
In his Responsibility and the moral sentiments, Wallace develops the idea that we should think of what it is to be morally responsible for an act in terms of norms for holding someone responsible forExpand
The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy
ACCOUNTS OF MORAL responsibility come in two main flavors. There are accounts that hold that an agent is responsible for something (an act, omission, attitude, and so on) just in case that agentExpand
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions
Philosophers often call emotions appropriate or inappropriate. What is meant by such talk? In one sense, explicated in this paper, to call an emotion appropriate is to say that the emotion isExpand
In Praise of Blame
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically-oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibilityExpand
Why Idealize?*
Roderick Firth claims that ethical truth is not determined or constituted by what we—nonideal as we are—want or choose, but by what ideal observers (that is, observers who are omniscient,Expand
Rationality and Reasons
When Ingmar and I discuss metaphysics or morality, our views are seldom far apart. But on the subjects of this paper, rationality and reasons, we deeply disagree. I had intended this paper to inclndeExpand
Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason*
This essay defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and bringExpand
The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value*
According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, on this view, theExpand