Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will

  title={Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will},
  author={Robert Kane},
  journal={The Journal of Ethics},
  • R. Kane
  • Published 13 June 2016
  • Philosophy
  • The Journal of Ethics
In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes (such as blame, resentment, indignation, and moral approval) were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential… 

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  • K. Ota
  • Philosophy
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies
  • 2021
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