Moral Luck: Internal and external reasons

@inproceedings{Williams1981MoralLI,
  title={Moral Luck: Internal and external reasons},
  author={Bernard Arthur Owen Williams},
  year={1981}
}
Sentences of the forms ‘ A has a reason to φ’ or ‘There is a reason for A to φ’ (where ‘φ’ stands in for some verb of action) seem on the face of it to have two different sorts of interpretation. On the first, the truth of the sentence implies, very roughly, that A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his φ-ing, and if this turns out not to be so the sentence is false: there is a condition relating to the agent's aims, and if this is not satisfied it is not true to say, on this… Expand
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