Moral Facts and Suitably Informed Subjects: A Reply to Denham

@inproceedings{Mcgonigal2005MoralFA,
  title={Moral Facts and Suitably Informed Subjects: A Reply to Denham},
  author={A. Mcgonigal},
  year={2005}
}
  • A. Mcgonigal
  • Published 2005
  • Sociology
    • The nature of moral facts, and their relationship to rationality, imagination and sentiment, have been central and pressing issues in recent moral philosophy. In this paper, I discuss and criticise a meta-ethical theory put forward by Alison Denham, which views moral facts as being constituted by the responses of ideal, empathetic agents. I argue that Denham`s account is radically unstable, in that she has given us an account of the nature of such agents which is inconsistent with an… CONTINUE READING
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