• DOI:10.1007/S10806-018-9730-Y
• Corpus ID: 158150659

Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance

@article{Horta2018MoralCA,
  title={Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance},
  author={Oscar Horta},
  journal={Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics},
  year={2018},
  volume={31},
  pages={369-388}
}

• Oscar Horta
• Published 6 April 2018
• Philosophy
• Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics

The argument from relevance expresses an intuition that, although shared by many applied ethicists, has not been analyzed and systematized in the form of a clear argument thus far. This paper does this by introducing the concept of value relevance, which has been used before in economy but not in the philosophical literature. The paper explains how value relevance is different from moral relevance, and distinguishes between direct and indirect ways in which the latter can depend on the former. These clarifications allow the argument to explain in detail how we can make two claims. The first one is that being a recipient of value should be the only criterion for full moral considerability. This follows if we accept that value relevance should determine, directly or indirectly, moral relevance. The second claim is that, given what the main theories of wellbeing imply regarding what entities can be recipients of value, sentience is both a sufficient and a necessary criterion for full moral considerability. The paper argues that this conclusion stands even if we hold views that consider other values different from sentience.