Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance

@article{Horta2018MoralCA,
  title={Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance},
  author={Oscar Horta},
  journal={Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics},
  year={2018},
  volume={31},
  pages={369-388}
}
  • Oscar Horta
  • Published 6 April 2018
  • Philosophy
  • Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics
The argument from relevance expresses an intuition that, although shared by many applied ethicists, has not been analyzed and systematized in the form of a clear argument thus far. This paper does this by introducing the concept of value relevance, which has been used before in economy but not in the philosophical literature. The paper explains how value relevance is different from moral relevance, and distinguishes between direct and indirect ways in which the latter can depend on the former… 

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Preface Acknowledgments Part I: The Moral (In)Significance of Reason 1. Why Should I Be Rational? "Rationality" and Its Alternatives * The Methodological Counterattack * The Moral of the Story 2.

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