Moral Complexity

  title={Moral Complexity},
  author={Darcia Narvaez},
  journal={Perspectives on Psychological Science},
  pages={163 - 181}
  • D. Narvaez
  • Published 1 March 2010
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Perspectives on Psychological Science
Recently, intuitionist theories have been effective in capturing the academic discourse about morality. Intuitionist theories, like rationalist theories, offer important but only partial understanding of moral functioning. Both can be fallacious and succumb to truthiness: the attachment to one’s opinions because they “feel right,” potentially leading to harmful action or inaction. Both intuition and reasoning are involved in deliberation and expertise. Both are malleable from environmental and… 

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