Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence

@article{Feddersen2009MoralBI,
  title={Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence},
  author={Timothy Feddersen and Sean Gailmard and Alvaro Sandroni},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2009},
  volume={103},
  pages={175 - 192}
}
We argue that large elections may exhibit a moral bias (i.e., conditional on the distribution of preferences within the electorate, alternatives understood by voters to be morally superior are more likely to win in large elections than in small ones). This bias can result from ethical expressive preferences, which include a payoff voters obtain from taking an action they believe to be ethical. In large elections, pivot probability is small, so expressive preferences become more important… 
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