Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods

  title={Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods},
  author={Francisco Gallegos},
Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological… 
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