Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods

  title={Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods},
  author={Matthias Siemer},
  journal={Emotion Review},
  pages={256 - 263}
  • M. Siemer
  • Published 10 June 2009
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Emotion Review
The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of… 
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