• Corpus ID: 35589666

Monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules

@article{SnchezFernndez2019MonotonicityAI,
  title={Monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules},
  author={Luis S{\'a}nchez-Fern{\'a}ndez and Jes{\'u}s Arias-Fisteus},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1710.04246}
}
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity with respect to the support is studied when the set of voters does not change and when new voters enter the election. For each of these two cases we consider a strong and a weak version of the axiom. We observe certain incompatibilities between the monotonicity… 

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