Monotonic solutions of cooperative games

@article{Young1985MonotonicSO,
  title={Monotonic solutions of cooperative games},
  author={H. P. Young},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  year={1985},
  volume={14},
  pages={65-72}
}
  • H. P. Young
  • Published 1985
  • Mathematics
  • International Journal of Game Theory
  • The principle of monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that some player's contribution to all coalitions increases or stays the same then the player's allocation should not decrease. There is a unique symmetric and efficient solution concept that is monotonic in this most general sense — the Shapley value. Monotonicity thus provides a simple characterization of the value without resorting to the usual “additivity” and “dummy” assumptions, and lends support to the… CONTINUE READING
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