Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account

  title={Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account},
  author={M. Davies and Max Coltheart and Robyn Langdon and Nora Breen},
  journal={Philosophy, Psychiatry, \& Psychology},
  pages={133 - 158}
We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief… 

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