Corpus ID: 16939850

Monitoring the Monitors 1

  title={Monitoring the Monitors 1},
  author={Derek Horstmeyer},
In this paper, I address whether the sub-structure of the board has a material impact on the policies and internal governance of the board. Namely, I investigate how the size of the nominating committee and the cross-membership of directors between the nominating committee and other monitoring committees affect the effort level of directors and the self-assessment of the board. Through an examination of compensation, audit, and governance decisions, large nominating committees are at best… Expand

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