Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting

  title={Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting},
  author={Fahad Khalil and David Martimort and Bruno Parigi},
  journal={ERN: Internal \& External Contracting \& Transaction Costs (Topic)},

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