Money is Privacy

@article{Kahn2004MoneyIP,
  title={Money is Privacy},
  author={Charles M. Kahn and James McAndrews and William Roberds},
  journal={Monetary Economics},
  year={2004}
}
An extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record-keeping device. Money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly, and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information and thus the cost of credit-based transactions continues to fall. In this article we investigate another use for money, the provision of privacy. That is, a money purchase does not identify the purchaser, whereas a credit purchase does. In… 

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