Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation∗

  title={Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation∗},
  author={William Fuchs},
A Monetary Union is modeled as a technology that makes a surprise policy deviation impossible and requires voluntarily participating countries to follow the same monetary policy. Within a fully dynamic context, we identify conditions under which such arrangement may dominate a coordinated system with independent national currencies. Two new results are delivered by the voluntary participation assumption. First, optimal policy is shown to respond to the agents’ incentives to leave the union by… CONTINUE READING

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.

Explore Further: Topics Discussed in This Paper


Publications referenced by this paper.

Common Currencies versus Monetary Independence

  • Cooley, F Thomas, Vincenzo Quadrini
  • Review of Economic Studies,
  • 2003

Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation

  • Fuchs, William, Lippi, Francesco
  • CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4122
  • 2003

Currency Unions

  • Alesina, Alberto, Robert J. Barro
  • Quarterly Journal of Economics,
  • 2002

Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?

  • Aksoy, Yunus, Paul De Grauwe, Hans Dewachter
  • European Economic Review,
  • 2002

Gradualism in Trade Agreemnents with Asymmetric Countries

  • Bond, W Eric, Jee-Hyeong Park
  • Review of Economic Studies,
  • 2002

Political economics and macroeconomic policy

  • Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini
  • Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume I (North…
  • 1999

The history of monetary regimes — Some lessons for Sweden and the EMU

  • Bordo, D Michael, Lars
  • Jonung,
  • 1997

Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

  • Kocherlakota, R Narayana
  • Review of Economic Studies,
  • 1996

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…