• DOI:10.1080/713663077
• Corpus ID: 144385167

Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939

@article{Watson2000MolotovsAI,
  title={Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939},
  author={Derek Watson},
  journal={Europe-Asia Studies},
  year={2000},
  volume={52},
  pages={695 - 722}
}

• D. Watson
• Published 1 June 2000
• History
• Europe-Asia Studies

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS with Britain and France provided Molotov's formal introduction to the diplomatic world. They established his negotiating style, based less on the civilities of diplomacy than on his experience as chairman of Sovnarkom, as a member of the Politburo and other top party institutions, where he was prepared to hand out rude and rough treatment to others. The negotiations created a reputation for him in the international arena that was to remain, and perhaps dog him, for the rest of his political career. Much has been written about these talks from the Western point of view, less from the Soviet, and very little regarding Molotov's role. This article seeks to redress the balance and is the first attempt to review these negotiations using unpublished documents in the archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry formerly unavailable, although these mainly confirm the conclusions drawn from published Soviet documents and Western materials.1. From the beginning, the two sides approached the negotiations differently. The Western powers believed that war could still be avoided and, if it came, the USSR, much weakened by the purges, could only function as a supply base in a long war of attrition, not as a main military participant. The USSR, which approached the negotiations with caution because of the traditional hostility of the Western powers and its fear of 'capitalist encirclement', had little faith either that war could be avoided or in the Polish army. It wanted a guaranteed commitment of military support in a war in which the USSR would play an aggressive role in a two-pronged attack on Germany: from France and the USSR.2 These contrasting attitudes partly explain why the USSR has often been charged with playing a double game in 1939: carrying on open negotiations for a pact of mutual assistance with Britain and France whilst secretly engaging in parallel discussions with Germany for an agreement aimed against the Western democracies. Molotov has been accused both of artificially dragging out the talks with Britain and France by seizing on various inessential details to secure a successful outcome or better deal with Germany, and also of summarily breaking them off and concluding an alliance with Germany when on the verge of success with Britain and France. But the delays which Molotov caused were usually on issues essential to Soviet interests, and there appeared to be an impossible obstacle to the vital military convention with France and Britain when the agreement with Germany was signed. In contrast, the Western states, even taking into account that