Molinism and Compatibilism

@article{Perszyk2000MolinismAC,
  title={Molinism and Compatibilism},
  author={Kenneth J. Perszyk},
  journal={International Journal for Philosophy of Religion},
  year={2000},
  volume={48},
  pages={11-33}
}
  • Kenneth J. Perszyk
  • Published 2000
  • Philosophy
  • International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
L'article traite du molinisme et des critiques des thomistes a l'encontre de sa conception de la providence divine et d'autres de ses conceptions. L'A. questionne l'idee qu'un moliniste ne peut etre un compatibiliste et soutenir que l'action libre est possible sous le determinisme. 
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