Modularity in cognition: framing the debate.

  title={Modularity in cognition: framing the debate.},
  author={H. Clark Barrett and Robert Kurzban},
  journal={Psychological review},
  volume={113 3},
Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that… 

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