Modified Schelling Games

@article{Kanellopoulos2020ModifiedSG,
  title={Modified Schelling Games},
  author={P. Kanellopoulos and Maria Kyropoulou and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2020},
  volume={abs/2005.12149}
}
  • P. Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros A. Voudouris
  • Published 2020
  • Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is strategic and jumps to empty nodes of the graph aiming to maximize her utility, defined as the ratio of her friends in her neighborhood over the neighborhood size including herself. This is in contrast to the related literature on Schelling games which typically… CONTINUE READING

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